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The Transformation of Originality
in the Progressive-Era Debate over Copyright in News
Robert Brauneis∗
In 1991, a unanimous Supreme Court declared in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., Inc.1 that only those aspects of works which demonstrated a “modicum
of creativity”2 would be copyrightable. It thus excluded factual representations, which were not
“created” but merely “cop[ied] . . . from the world,”3 from copyright protection. That declaration
of a bedrock principle of copyright confirmed and extended the unanimous view of an otherwise
split Supreme Court in the 1918 case of International News Service v. Associated Press.4
Majority and dissenting opinions in INS all expressed the view that information about current
events – news – was not copyrightable apart from its literary form.5 Yet for the first threequarters of the nineteenth century, the notion that copyright incorporated an originality
requirement which excluded factual matter from protection was unknown to Anglo-American
law. Courts routinely found infringement of fact-based works, such as maps, charts, road-books,
directories, and calendars, on the basis of the copying of their factual content, and concluded that
the industry of plaintiffs in gathering and presenting facts – their “intellectual labor” -- should be
protected under copyright law.6 What caused the transformation in conceptions of originality
between the Civil War and World War I?
This article argues that the rise of creativity-based originality in copyright law has strong
ties to a previously little-examined episode in copyright history: the debate over legal protection
for news in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Until the 1880s, the American news
industry remained in a pre-copyright era, and played no part in copyright discourse. Most
newspapers were partisan organs that sought financial support at least as much from political
sponsors as from sales or advertising. Newspaper editors followed a widespread custom of
freely copying text from other newspapers. That custom was acknowledged and encouraged by
a massive government subsidy in the form of free postage for newspaper copies that were being
∗
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exchanged between editors. Newspaper owners never registered their papers before publication,
and thus forsook copyright protection for them.
In the middle decades of 1800s, however, social and technological changes radically
changed the structure of the news industry. Political subsidies for newspapers shrank, and
newspapers became more heavily dependent on sales and advertising. The introduction of the
telegraph provided newspapers with an opportunity to invest in more timely news; yet together
with improvements in typesetting, printing, and transportation technology, the telegraph also
created an appropriability problem. It shrank the lead-time advantage that newspapers
traditionally had relied upon to realize the value of their investment in news, and also exposed
them to competition from which they had previously been geographically isolated. At the same
time, the new communications technologies led to the emergence of companies and large
associations that dominated markets, often with the aid of anti-competitive practices. Prominent
among these were the news industry organizations of the Associated Press and the Western
Union.
Within this context, the Associated Press, Western Union and others began in the 1880s
to press for legal protection of news reports, in both legislative and judicial arenas. On the
legislative front, the Associated Press backed an 1884 effort to amend the Copyright Act to
provide protection for news items. Opposition to that effort led to the first prominent
articulations of the notion that facts are not created by authors, and are therefore not
copyrightable subject matter. After that effort failed, the Associated Press and others turned to
the courts. Paradoxically, their efforts to seek judicial protection for news ended up reinforcing
the creativity-based view of originality, because they resolved for strategic reasons to seek
protection outside of federal copyright law, in common law misappropriation, and decided to
argue that news was not copyrightable in order to avoid copyright preemption of their common
law claims.
Part I of this article sets the stage by briefly considering existing accounts of the rise of
creativity-based originality in American law. Part II reviews the intellectual-labor-based model
of originality that dominated Anglo-American copyright law in the nineteenth century, and
places it in the context of other copyright doctrine of the time. Part III first describes the
structure of the American news industry up through the mid-nineteenth century, and explains
why that industry operated entirely independently of copyright; in then considers the changes in
news industry structure caused by the telegraph and other new technologies, and explains how
those changes led the some industry elements to push for legal protection for news. Part IV
follows the legislative and judicial campaign for legal protection for news, and traces the
development of creativity-based originality rhetoric on both sides of that campaign. Part V
draws some conclusions about the broader history of copyright doctrine from this episode.
I. Do Existing Accounts Explain the Rise of Creativity-Based Originality in
American Law? Mark Rose, Martha Woodmansee, Peter Jaszi and others7 have noted the
7
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relationship between the creativity-based view of originality and the ideology of the “romantic
author” – the notion that the writer is not merely a craftsman, but “a unique individual uniquely
responsible for a unique product.”8 The connections between “romantic author” ideology and
the legal rights of authors, however, were explored in the mid- to late-eighteenth century in both
Germany9 and England.10 Much of the English exploration was in connection with two cases –
Millar v. Taylor11 and Donaldson v. Becket12 – that at least by 1834 were extremely well-known
in American legal circles, because Wheaton v. Peters,13 the momentous first copyright decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court, concerned similar issues and occasioned frequent references to
Millar and Donaldson by litigants and Justices alike. Yet, as will be detailed below in Part II,14
none of these debates had any significant influence on the concept of originality in American
copyright law before the Civil War. Rather, courts continued to consider works to be original
and copyrightable if they were created through the application of independent intellectual labor,
even if that labor involved gathering and representing facts rather than expressing anything
unique to an author.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
Inc.15 has focused attention on two Supreme Court cases decided, respectively, in 1879 and
1885: the Trade-Mark Cases16 and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.17 For Justice
O’Connor, the Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles were the first two cases in which the
Supreme Court addressed originality, and articulated from the very beginning exactly same view
that Feist itself adopts: that the originality requirement precludes any copyright protection for
bare representations of fact, because such representations do not exhibit the creativity required
by both the Copyright Act and the Constitution. If these cases were indeed the crucial turning
points in the treatment of originality in American copyright law, one could argue that the concept
of originality evolved because the Supreme Court had to confront for the first time the issues
raised by these two cases: respectively, whether the federal constitution empowered Congress to
regulate trademarks, and whether it empowered Congress to grant copyright protection to
photographs.
This article does not seek to prove that the Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles have no
place in a history of evolving concepts of originality in U.S. copyright law. It does seek to
suggest, however, that those cases do not express and implement a change in conception of
originality nearly as clearly as it would appear from their treatment in Feist, and that it is
therefore possible that another factor made a major contribution to that change. As for the
Trade-Mark Cases, the language in Justice Miller’s opinion for the Court, passages of which are
quoted and paraphrased in Feist, is much more equivocal than might at first appear through
modern eyes. When Justice Miller seeks to identify those ingredients that distinguish copyrights
8
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(and patents) from trademarks, he does use phrases such as “the creative powers of the mind,”
“fancy or imagination,” and “genius”18 – phrases that one could easily view as representing a
creativity-based, romantic author view of originality. In the very same sentences, however, he
also uses phrases such as “the fruits of intellectual labor,” “work of the brain,” and “laborious
thought,”19 seemingly without any sense that these phrases are in tension with those referring to
“creative powers” and “genius.” Given those juxtapositions, there is no reason to believe that
Justice Miller would not find whatever “creative powers” are essential to copyright in the
“intellectual labor” performed by a mapmaker when measuring and representing the height of a
mountain or its latitude and longitude, or performed by the author of a directory when
ascertaining the names of the people who live or work at each address in a city. Thus, the TradeMark Cases exhibit, at best, a transitional, ambiguous view of the originality requirement.
At issue in Burrow-Giles was whether the Constitution empowered Congress to protect
photography under copyright law. Before photography, the pathway from states of affairs in the
world to fixed, copyrightable representations of them always went through the human mind: the
minds of mapmakers, directory compilers, and engravers directed the hands that fixed factual
representations. Photography took human minds out of that pathway: light, reflected off objects
in the world and bent through a lens, fixed an image directly on a tangible, photosensitive
medium. Infringement defendants took advantage of this novelty to argue that photographs did
not have an author, and therefore could not constitutionally be protected under the Patent and
Copyright Clause, which granted Congress the power to protect only authors and inventors.
When the issue reached the Supreme Court in 1884, the Court was forced to articulate exactly
what it was that made photographs works of authorship. Its answer – that photographs were
copyrightable “so far as they are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the
author”20 – went far towards adopting a creativity-based view of originality, as it placed
originality inside the mind of the author.
Yet photography was not destined to remain the driving force behind adoption of a new
conception of originality, in part because courts found the copyrightable expression in
photographs to be more tightly bound to their representational content than expression and fact
were bound in literary works. It was possible to rewrite a news story that had appeared in a
competitor’s newspaper and claim that one was only taking unprotected facts; it was not possible
to “rewrite” a photograph that a competitor had published. And while Burrow-Giles could be
read as suggesting that the photographer demonstrated creativity only in physically manipulating
the scene in front of the camera, courts came to recognize that the necessary creativity could be
found in the decision about where and when to release the shutter, a decision that accompanied
the taking of every photograph. As Arthur Weil phrased it in his 1916 copyright treatise, “The
elements of thought, arrangement and selection, which appealed to the Court in the Sarony case,
are present . . . in the taking of all photographs. Their manifestation is a matter of degree, but
their presence, to some extent, no matter how small, is always demonstrable.”21 If courts find
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creativity-based originality in all photographs, even those that photojournalistically document the
world, and if any work that is not an exact copy of a photograph does not have the audience
appeal and thus the commercial value of the original, then the choice between labor-based and
creativity-based views of originality will not matter much to photography, and photography will
not – and did not – remain a focal point of the debate between those views. Thus, neither
romantic author ideology, nor the Trade-Mark Cases, nor Burrow-Giles exclude the possibility
that there was another major force at work in the transformation of the concept of originality in
copyright law. This article will contend that the changing structure of the news industry,
resulting in demands for and objections to protection for news, was that major force.
II. Originality in Nineteenth-Century Copyright: Intellectual Labor and “Original
Sources of Information Open to All”
For most of the nineteenth century, American publishing, and hence copyright litigation,
was dominated by various types of practical, nonfiction works.22 Following English precedent,
American courts crafted a doctrine of originality that included the factual content gathered in
these works as copyrightable subject matter. The 1828 case that first discussed the originality
requirement in American copyright law, Blunt v. Patten,23 presented an analysis that would be
used in dozens of cases throughout the rest of the nineteenth century. In Blunt, Supreme Court
Justice Smith Thompson, writing as a circuit judge, considered mapmaker Edmund Blunt’s claim
that Richard Patten had infringed his copyright in a nautical chart of the coast of northeastern
North America. Thompson writes:
The natural objects from which the charts are made are open to the examination of all,
and any one has a right to survey and make a chart. And if such surveys and charts are all
correct, all will be alike, but no one would complain of his rights having been infringed,
and each one may be considered an original chart. A right, in such a subject, is violated
only when another copies from the chart of him who has secured the copyright, and
thereby availing himself of his labor and skill.24
This passage approaches originality as a matter of independent creation. If many people
survey the same coastal region and make charts, states Justice Thompson, each of those charts
will be original. Conversely, however, if one person copies a copyrighted chart made by
another, he will infringe that copyright. That the copyrighted chart merely accurately represents
the position of shores and the depth of the water in a particular area is not a defense to
infringement. Those representations are part of the protected subject-matter of the map. The
representations should be protected because they were the product of the “labor and skill” of the

requires originality to determine just when to take the photograph, so as to bring out the proper setting for both
animate and inanimate objects, with the adjunctive features of light, shade, position, etc.).
22
See Jane Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1865 (1990); Miriam Bitton, Trends in Protection for Informational Works under Copyright Law in the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 115 (2006).
23
3 F. Cas. 763 (No. 1580) (1828). This is the report of Blunt’s action in equity seeking an injunction; a companion
report of Blunt’s qui tam action seeking a monetary penalty is found at 3 F. Cas. 762 (No. 1579)(1828).
24
Blunt, 3 F. Cas. 763, 764-65. For an echo of this logic and rhetoric in dictum in a mid-20th-century opinion, see
Mazer v. Stein, 340 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954).
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chart maker. Thus, although Blunt v. Patten does not use the phrase “sweat of the brow,”25 the
theory that factual representations should be protected as the intellectual labor of an author enters
American copyright law in the very first case to discuss originality.
Justice Thompson cites no sources, but he almost certainly drew his analysis from
existing English treatises and cases. Robert Henley Eden’s 1821 treatise on the Law of
Injunctions,26 for example, notes that “maps, charts, road-books, calendars, books of chronology,
tables of interest &c”27 are all protected by copyright, and comments that as between two such
works on the same subject,
although if the same skill, intellect, and diligence, are applied in the second instance, the
public will receive nearly the same information from both works; yet there is no doubt
that the latter publisher cannot on that account spare himself the labour and expense of
actual survey, and that a court of equity will interfere to prevent a mere republication of a
work, which the labour and skill of another person has supplied to the world.28
That statement turns out to be an almost exact quote from the 1809 English case of Longman v.
Winchester,29 in which Lord Eldon upheld an injunction against the publication of a “calendar,”30
the contents of which were largely copied from the plaintiffs’ work.

25
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works protected by copyright are conceived of as exhibiting an essential unity – they are all “mental productions”;
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Charles Adams’s copy of this publication can be found at http://www.archive.org/details/courtcitykalenda00john.
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Dozens of similar examples from English and American cases and treatises could be
cited. The most important example in an American treatise is probably a passage in Joseph
Story’s influential and widely distributed Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence,31 first
published in 1836: “The difficulty [in cases of maps, charts, translations, and road books] is to
distinguish, what belongs to the exclusive labors of a single mind, from what is the common
source of the materials of the knowledge used by all. . . . [A second man] may work on the same
original materials; but he cannot exclusively and evasively use those already collected and
embodied by another.”32 Another important appearance is in George Ticknor Curtis’s 1847
Treatise on the Law of Copyright, the first American treatise devoted solely to copyright. Curtis
echoes Story, and earlier English cases: “[I]f a person collects an account of natural curiosities . .
. or of mere matters of statistical or geographical information, and employs the labor of his mind
in giving a description of them, his own description may be the subject of copyright.”33 He
makes it equally clear that copyright in such a work protects, not just stylistic flourishes, but the
factual representation itself: “It is equally competent to any other person to compile and publish
a similar work. But it must be substantially new and original, like the first work, by resort to the
original sources, and must not copy or adopt from the other, upon the notion that the subject is
common.”34
Courts and commentators continued to use this analysis and logic right into the 1880s.
American cases like Lawrence v. Dana (1869),35 Farmer v. Calvert Lithographic, Engraving &
Map Publishing Co. (1872),36 Banks v. McDivitt (1875),37 and List Publishing Co. v. Keller
(1887),38 and English cases like Kelly v. Morris (1866),39 Morris v. Ashbee (1868),40 and Hogg v.

31
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of information, and having ascertained those boundaries, to have drawn them upon his map, notwithstanding that in
this respect it would have been precisely like plaintiff’s map (which of course it would have been if they were both
correct). But he had no right to avail himself of this very labor on the part of complainant in order to avoid it
himself.”).
37
2 F. Cas. 759 (1875) (No. 961).
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Scott (1874)41 all followed the pattern, as did American treatises like James Appleton Morgan’s
The Law of Literature (1875)42 and Eaton Drone’s Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual
Productions (1879),43 and English treatises like Walter Arthur Copinger’s Law of Copyright (2d
ed. 1881).44 The Supreme Court did not have occasion to decide whether copyright protection
extended to representations of facts; before 1879, it had only decided seven cases that touched on
copyright issues.45 As already mentioned above, however, Supreme Court Justices Joseph Story
and Smith Thompson did have occasion to do so while riding circuit, and both held that copying
of factual content could amount to copyright infringement.
Factual accounts may have been embraced as copyrightable subject matter, but that did
not mean that copying a small portion, or even a substantial portion, of someone’s factual
account would necessarily amount to infringement. Two doctrines concerning the scope of
copyright protection are important to understanding why such copying might not constitute
infringement. The first is the “new toil” or improvement doctrine, under which a charge of
infringement might be avoided by demonstrating that the defendant added substantially new
material or otherwise improved an older work, even if he admittedly copied from the old. For
example, in the 1847 case of Webb v. Powers,46 the court stated that a new compilation may
infringe an older one if it uses too much of the latter, “and is not characterized by enough new or
improved, to indicate new toil or talent.”47 This doctrine came under attack by the midnineteenth century, and has been contemptuously rejected by jurists of the stature of Learned
Hand,48 but in a weakened form it still survives as the transformative use factor of fair use
analysis.49
Second, courts and commentators began to use a “market substitute” approach to
copyright infringement, in part as a replacement for the “new toil” doctrine, although the two
approaches could in some cases lead to similar results.50 L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce have
41
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46
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49
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (“the goal of copyright, to promote science and the
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works . . . and the more transformative the new work,
the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use”);
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d
244 (2d Cir. 2006).
50
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the transformation. Other transformations, however – for example,. a “new and improved” version of a book with a
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dubbed the approach a “monopoly of the market” approach.51 Importantly, that approach
focused heavily on actual markets, not on “potential markets” as the fourth factor in the section
107 fair use inquiry now does.52 What copyright protected was the copying of enough of the
plaintiff’s work that the defendant’s work would function as a market substitute for the plaintiff’s
work. Thus, for example, some abridgments of other works would not infringe, because they
would be “much less complete and useful” than the original, would be “suited for a different and
humbler class of readers . . . rather than a substitute with the same class.”53
The crucial point here is that neither the “new toil” doctrine nor the “market substitute”
doctrine was thought to be limited to factual works. Rather, these doctrines formed part of
infringement analysis for the full range of copyrightable subject matter. Thus, for example, a
translation of a novel, a work of pure fiction, might equally be found not to amount to
infringement, on the ground that it was the product of significant new toil, or was not a market
substitute for the novel in its original language.54 The result was that these doctrines provided a
kind of “safety valve,” allowing the copying of significant factual matter that, if prohibited,
might call the institution of copyright into question, without singling out factual accounts as
needing a special exemption from copyright protection.
One last case deserves extended discussion. In 1829, a year after Blunt v. Patten, Justice
Thompson, again riding circuit, decided in a case called Clayton v. Stone55 that a “price-current”
– a daily newspaper that reported commodity prices – was not a “book” within the meaning of
the Copyright Act, which at the time extended copyright protection only to “maps, charts and
books.” First, reasoned Justice Thompson, the Copyright Act should be read in light of the
purpose of copyright as stated in the constitution, namely, to promote the progress of Science.
To contribute to science, works had to be of a “permanent and durable character”; 56 the
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plaintiff’s newspaper was of too “fluctuating and fugitive a form.”57 Second, the copyright act
prescribed formalities that seemed so lengthy and cumbersome – most pointedly, a requirement
that a copy of the work’s registration be published for four weeks in at least one newspaper – that
it seemed unlikely that Congress intended them to apply to “a work of so ephemeral a character
as that of a newspaper.”58
It is tempting to read current categories back on to the Clayton case and conclude that the
newspaper was denied copyright because its contents – commodity price quotations – were
purely factual and thus unoriginal. But the analysis in the case does not proceed along those
lines, and, indeed, one would not expect Justice Thompson, the author of Blunt v. Patten, to use
such an analysis. Rather, the relevant distinctions were between lasting contributions and
ephemeral ones, and between learning and mere industry. An 1848 case which uses the same
analysis makes it clear that the Clayton distinctions did not exclude factual matter from copyright
protection. In Scoville v. Toland,59 Justice John McLean held that labels, which served the
purely commercial purpose of identifying goods for sale, were not copyrightable. At the same
time, he commented that “lunar tables” – tables showing the dates on which the moon is in its
various phases – were copyrightable books even if only printed on a single sheet. That the lunar
tables were purely factual was not a matter of which Justice McLean took any note. Rather, he
was satisfied that they made a lasting contribution to learning or science, instead of being
ephemeral or commercial in character.
The holding of Clayton v. Stone is of uncertain scope – was it supposed to disqualify
from copyright only commodity price reports, or did it extend more broadly to cover the contents
of all daily newspapers?60 There was never any chance to find out, because, in spite of the
57
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dominance of nonfiction works in American copyright litigation over the next fifty years, no
reported case concerned a newspaper. Why was that? One answer is that newspapers might
have been deterred from seeking copyright by the burdensome requirements of registration. That
answer is not satisfactory, however, because if copyright protection were important to
newspapers, they would have sought reform of the registration requirement, and they did not do
so until the 1880s. Thus the question remains, and because the answer to this question is crucial
to understanding originality doctrine for most of the nineteenth century, this article turns to the
task of providing one.
III. The Nineteenth Century News Industry: Tradition and Change
A. Pre-Telegraph News Gathering and Dissemination: The Dominance of the
Exchange System and the Partisan Press. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century,
newspapers gathered out-of-town news primarily by means of exchanging copies of their papers
with newspapers from other cities. Well-established newspapers in large cities would have
exchange relationships with dozens and even hundreds of other newspapers. Thus, for example,
the Washington, D.C.-based Daily National Intelligencer boasted in 1820: “We receive at our
office about three hundred papers, printed in all parts of the United States, from Mobile and New
Orleans south, to Detroit north; and from Eastport in the east, to Arkansaw in the west. . . From
Upper and Lower Canada, we receive several newspapers . . .”61
This exchange system was promoted and heavily subsidized by the colonial post office,
and after independence by the federal post office, which until 1873 carried newspaper exchanges
without charge. The practice started by custom in the early 1700s, and was officially sanctioned
in a 1758 policy statement by Benjamin Franklin and William Hunter, joint deputy postmasters
general for the American colonies.62 In 1792, Congress enacted the exchange privilege into
federal law, declaring “That every printer of newspapers may send one paper to each and every
other printer of newspapers within the United States, free of postage . . .”63
The scale of the resulting exchange system was vast. In 1843, just before the advent of
the telegraph, an estimated seven million exchanges were carried by the post office free of
charge.64 As Richard Kielbowicz has calculated, that meant that, on average, each of the 1600
York seemed to assume as a matter of course that an issue of Harper’s Weekly, properly registered before
publication, was under copyright as a book. See Harper v. Shoppell, 26 F. 519 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). The particular
portion of the periodical at issue was an engraving. Oddly enough, Harper cites Clayton v. Stone as supporting the
proposition that a “book” in the copyright sense can be a single sheet of paper (and by extension, can be a
newspaper). See id. at 519.
61
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newspapers in the country was receiving about 4400 exchanges per year, or about a dozen every
day.65 The weight of these exchanges probably amounted to 15% or more of the total weight of
mail carried by the United States postal system, yet the service was provided completely free of
charge, to promote the government policy of spreading news throughout the nation.
Why was news gathered and spread through this informal system of exchanges, rather
than through propertization and sale of news items? If the legal structure for propertization was
not in place, why didn’t newspapers more actively lobby for it? Likely economic explanations
include the difficulty of enforcing any such rights, the purely local nature of newspaper
publishing (which avoided direct competition with all out-of-town papers), and the lead-time
advantage within local markets due to existing typesetting and printing technology. In addition,
many newspapers looked as much to partisan subsidies and patronage as to markets for support.
As for the difficulty of enforcement, intercity transportation and hence communication in
the pre-telegraph era was slow. Historical geographer Allan Pred has measured the mean lagtime of information between American cities from the 1790s to the 1840s. In 1794, it took about
seven days on average for news to travel between New York and Washington, DC, and 45 days
for news to travel from New York to Cincinnati.66 Twenty-one years later, in 1817, the time-lag
from New York to Washington three days; New York to Cincinnati was 19 days; and New York
to Chicago was 43 days.67 By 1841, with the coming of the railroad, news could travel from
New York to Washington in as little as ten hours,68 but the average time lag was still longer; the
lag between New York and Cincinnati was about eight days, and from New York to Chicago
about 10 days.
The slow speed of communication also made it difficult to manage businesses that had
locations in many different cities. Almost all newspapers, just as most other businesses at the
time, served purely local markets, and therefore did not care if newspapers in other cities copied
their stories.
The pre-electronic delivery of news through the transportation system, by means of the
physical delivery of newspapers, could also lead to evidentiary difficulties in demonstrating that
one newspaper copied another. The same carriage, ship, or railroad that brought one newspaper
brought others, and also usually brought people who themselves knew the news from the
departure city. Under the exchange system, it was the custom for newspapers to credit the source
of news items, both as a courtesy and to enhance credibility; but if newspapers had wanted to
conceal the source of their news, it is likely that they often could have.
Many larger cities had more than one newspaper, and there certainly was competition
between them. But newspapers could often effectively compete against other local papers
65
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without propertizing news, given the time and cost of copying. Until the 1884 invention of the
linotype machine by Ottmar Mergenthaler, type was set by hand, as it had been for several
centuries, and it took hours to set type for a newspaper edition. Printing technology improved
dramatically during the nineteenth century – the steam-powered press and the rotary press,
invented in 1812 and 1847, respectively, changed top printing speeds from about 300 pages per
hour to 20,000 -- but it still took several hours to print and assemble an edition of a newspaper in
any volume. In addition, most newspapers worked on a daily schedule; it cost them more to
print an “extra” that was released outside the normal schedule. As a result, a newspaper that
obtained a “scoop” on a news story usually got a lead-time advantage of at least several hours,
and often an entire day. That was likely enough to sell a large number of newspapers, and over
time to gain a reputation as a better newspaper. In 1851, Horace Greeley, editor of the New
York Tribune, went to London to testify before a parliamentary committee, and gave an account
of the lead-time advantage he thought his paper enjoyed:
The fact that certain journals have the earliest news soon becomes notorious, and almost
every one wants his newspaper with his breakfast, delivered between the hours of five
and half past seven. They take the morning papers to read with their breakfast; and those
who take the news after we issue it can not have it in time to deliver it to a very large
number in a suitable morning season, and we regard it as of no consequence.69
Another important factor in the first half of the nineteenth century was the dominance of
the partisan press. Most newspapers were identified with a political party, and were heavily
subsidized to serve as the party organ. At every level and from every branch of government,
newspaper owners received lucrative printing contracts from the party in power. For example,
from 1819 to 1846, each house of Congress elected a printer to publish its proceedings; the
contracts, which went to the publishers of such newspapers as the National Intelligencer, the
Globe, and the Madisonian, carried profit margins of 20 to 55 percent.70 Moreover, members of
Congress had franking privileges – the ability to use the postal system free of charge – and
frequently used it to send favored newspapers for free across the country.71 Over in the
executive branch, President Andrew Jackson awarded printing contracts to Jacksonian
69
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newspapers, not only in Washington, D.C., but in Louisville, Boston, Philadelphia, Concord and
Columbia.72 He also appointed editors of favored newspapers to patronage positions, of which
the most popular was postmaster; between 50 and 60 newspaper editors around the country
received patronage jobs.73 Support of partisan newspapers was just as common at the state and
local level.74 Newspapers of the era thus tended to be focused on politics and political news,75
and sought their rewards more from governments and political parties than from subscribers,
single-copy purchasers, or advertisers. In this respect, newspaper editors were like composers of
just a few generations before – they looked to patrons rather than markets as their primary source
of support.76
The end result of these technological and social conditions was that newspapers had little
or no need for copyright, and embraced a culture of copying. It would thus be a mistake to
conclude that the placement of the newspapers outside of the copyright system was the result of a
single judicial decision like Clayton v. Stone, or of a single statutory requirement like that of
registration. Undoubtedly, registering each daily issue of a paper could amount to a significant
expense, and several authors mention the inconvenience of registration as a reason why
newspapers were not copyrighted. For example, in his 1875 treatise, James Appleton Morgan
wrote that “[t]he impractability of copyrighting under the statutes each succeeding issue of a
newspaper, renders them somewhat independent of the laws of copyright, though there is no
reason why each successive issue should not be duly entered according to act of congress, if the
proprietor should desire to do so.”77 Four years later, in 1879, Eaton Drone chimed in: “In the
case of a daily newspaper, [registering each issue] will be found inconvenient and perhaps
impracticable. In practice, it is not done.”78 Yet in weighing the impracticability of registration,
72
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one has to consider the potential benefits of registration, as well as the burden. The fact was that
the potential benefits were slight, so that taking on even a modest burden did not seem
worthwhile.
The fact that newspapers, for economic reasons, remained outside of the copyright
system, had a significant if completely unnoticed impact on the prevailing intellectual-labor view
of the originality requirement for copyright. That view purported to be quite broad in scope: any
factual representation was the result of mental labor and was therefore copyrightable, and no one
could copy wholesale that representation as a substitute for going out into the world and doing
the hard work of gathering the factual details himself. By its own terms, that logic should apply
to narrative accounts of current events, as well as non-narrative representations of states of
affairs like maps and city directories. In practice, however, so long as newspapers remained
outside of copyright, originality doctrine did not have to come to grips with copyright issues
concerning such news accounts.
Moreover, the effect of newspapers remaining outside of copyright spread beyond the
papers themselves to any historical or biographical account that was not based on first-hand
observation, since the great bulk of second-hand accounts could be traced through uncopyrighted
newspapers. Thus, for example, in the 1841 case of Folsom v. Marsh79 the plaintiffs claimed that
the defendants had copied many of George Washington’s letters, but they made no claim as to
the historical narrative that accompanied the letters and put them into context. Justice Story
wrote: “So far as the narrative goes, it is either original, or derived (at least as far as the matter
has been brought before the court) from common sources of information, open to all authors.”80
The phrase “common sources of information, open to all authors” was usually used to refer to the
world itself, but events that had taken place long ago were as a practical matter no longer “open
to all authors.” What were still available to authors were newspaper accounts, or histories
derived from newspaper accounts. Because they were not under copyright, they were also
“common sources of information, open to all authors.”
B. Mid-Century Changes in News Gathering and Dissemination: The Telegraph and
the Demise of the Party Press. The invention and deployment of the electric telegraph
dramatically changed many industries, and the news industry was prominent among them.
Telegraph lines began commercial operation in the mid-1840s. Within two decades, they
blanketed the country. By 1866, Western Union controlled 37,380 miles of telegraph lines and
2,250 telegraph offices in almost every town and city of any size in the United States.81 1866
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also marked the completion of the first successful transatlantic cable,82 thus enabling telegraphic
communication between the Old World and the New.83 A transcontinental telegraph line from
Chicago to San Francisco had been completed in 1861, eight years before the transcontinental
railroad. Through a combination of effects, this revolutionary telecommunications technology
enabled and spurred on calls for increased legal protection for news.
First, the speed of communication over long distances made possible the development of
geographically dispersed, and hence larger, business organizations. Management in one city
could receive reports from and send orders to employees in other cities within minutes, if
necessary, and daily interaction could become routine.84 Two prime examples of the
development of larger organizations were those intimately associated with news gathering and
dissemination: Western Union and the Associated Press. By 1866, Western Union became the
first industrial monopoly, controlling over 90% of the telegraph business in the United States.85
The Associated Press, founded in 1848 just after the commercialization of the telegraph,
underwent several reorganizations in the second half of the nineteenth century, but in one form
or another dominated news gathering and dissemination in the United States after the Civil War.
Although most individual newspapers remained locally owned, they were members of
associations that competed on a national scale. Exchanges of news between members were now
centrally controlled, and exchanges of news with non-members were prohibited, on pain of
revocation of membership.86
Telegraphic communication also made it easier to pursue enforcement actions in places
remote from a business’s head office – communications between attorney and client allowed for
effective pursuit and control of litigation. By the 1890s, the Associated Press was involved in
lawsuits against newspapers in New York, Washington, D.C., Minneapolis, Milwaukee,
Chicago, and St. Louis, a geographic reach of litigation that would have been unthinkable
without communication by telegraph.87 Moreover, telegraphic communication would often make
it easier to prove that the plaintiff’s news dispatch was the source of the defendant’s story. The
telegraph message carrying the news arrived long before any people who might be carrying it as
word-of-mouth, and as long as Western Union and Associated Press were dominant, there were
unlikely to be other telegraph lines or news services through which the defendant could have
gotten the story.
Second, the telegraph could effectively destroy the lead-time advantage that had
previously protected news organizations. Several competitive scenarios irked newspapers that
82
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had spent money to gather news. Large-city newspapers had begun to gain audiences in the
surrounding countryside as improved railroad lines made far-flung distribution possible in less
than a day. Small-town papers along those railroad lines, however, would arrange for agents to
telegraph the news as soon as the big-city papers were available in the big cities, and the smalltown papers could then go to press before the train from the big city arrived. Thus, Frederic
Hudson reported in 1873, a “journalist that was desirous of an influence beyond the limits of the
city where his newspaper is published” did not always view the telegraph kindly, “especially
when he reads an announcement that ‘the Elmira (N.Y.) Advertiser publishes telegraph news
fifteen hours in advance of the receipt of the New York dailies.’”88
Lead-time advantage was also destroyed when telegraphic transmissions cut across time
zones. The Associated Press and some of the New York newspapers complained about this
scenario in the early 1880s: “The complaint is made that the New York correspondents for
newspapers in Chicago and other points west to San Francisco, by reason of the difference of
time in their favor, can, without credit, telegraph all there is worth telegraphing from New York
to their respective journals. They not only can, but do. One or two San Francisco newspapers,
because of this, have given notice of a desire to withdraw from the Associated Press.”89 The
facts of International News Service v. Associated Press,90 the famous case that ended up in the
Supreme Court in 1918 (and to which this Article will return), involve such a scenario. The
International News Service was allegedly copying Associated Press news stories as they were
published in New York newspapers, and telegraphing them to the west coast, three time zones
earlier. West coast newspapers that were INS subscribers could then print the news in time for
their morning or evening editions, and compete head-on against their AP-subscriber
competitors.91
A third scenario involving the loss of lead time arose with the development of “tickers,”
machines that could print text from a telegraphic signal without the need of a human operator.
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Without the need for a human intermediary, telegraphed news began to be distributed directly
and continuously to end-user subscribers, who had such machines installed in their offices,
shops, hotels, or restaurants. A competing company could have an employee read a ticker tape
in a public place or in the office of a conspiring subscriber, and then enter the news dispatches
into its own distribution system, which would have its own subscribers. Instead of typesetting
and printing, the only action required was telegraphic keying or typing, and there were no
editions on a daily cycle, because the ticker tape ran continuously. In such circumstances, lead
time could be cut from hours to a minute or less.92
Although the telegraph did not have as much effect on the traditional cross-town
newspaper rivalry, ongoing technological developments in typesetting and printing were cutting
lead time between cross-town rivals, and occasionally the telegraph also had a role to play in
those situations. For example, in the 1860s, the San Francisco Bulletin and the Sacramento
Union had succeeded in excluding other area papers from gaining access to the transcontinental
telegraph lines, and thus excluded them from direct access to news telegraphed from the East
Coast. Another San Francisco paper, the Alta California, waited for the Union to be published in
Sacramento, and then had an agent telegraph the Union’s news over a Sacramento – San
Francisco telegraph line. The Alta eventually convinced the Bulletin and the Union to let it join
their scheme, but other excluded San Francisco newspapers continued the practice.93
Third, although communication by telegraph was of great value to many people, it was
also very expensive. The initial capital costs of setting up a telegraph line across hundreds or
thousands of miles could be enormous, and operating and maintenance costs were also
substantial. While the newspaper exchange system had been heavily subsidized by the federal
government through free postal carriage, the telegraph system did not benefit from government
largesse on such a scale.
Of course, some of the messages carried by telegraph were private and of value only to
particular individuals or businesses; those individuals or businesses who wanted to send or
receive them would pay for the privilege. Other messages, such as timely commodity or stock
price reports, were particularly valuable to a relatively small group of investors and traders.
Those individuals and firms would also pay for that information; channels of communication
could be relatively well-protected against unauthorized tapping; authorized recipients could be
bound by subscription contracts not to pass it on to others; and enforcement against third parties
who were inducing breaches of those contracts could be sought under trade secret law.
That still left a lot of information about current events that was of interest to, and valued
by, the general public. How could the cost of gathering and transmitting that information be
borne by the public, to whom it was of value? Newspapers had not previously had to face this
problem, in part because they were often supported as partisan organs by governments and
political parties, and in part because they enjoyed lead-time advantages over copiers. If
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technological developments cut lead time, social developments cut political patronage. It is not
within the scope of this paper to trace those complicated social developments. It is clear,
however, that during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, newspapers moved
dramatically away from political parties, and began to rely much more on sales and advertising
for revenue.94 One might therefore see the adoption by Congress in 1846 of a low-bid system for
awarding printing contracts as signaling the end of an era.95
Thus, arguably, the decline of patronage and lead time left news organizations to deal
with a classic problem of appropriability.96 Of course, as we will see, opponents of protection
for the news strongly disputed the existence of such a problem, and the issue whether any
particular level of protection for news or newspapers would optimize the production of news is
beyond the scope of this paper. It is clear, however, that some news organizations sought to
convince Congress and the courts of the existence of an appropriability problem; that they had a
plausible story to tell; and that developments in communications technology made possible a
new business model for journalism – the selling or licensing of news stories, rather than informal
exchange and sharing – that was more difficult to put into practice without some legal protection
for news.
IV: Efforts to Protect News in Congress and the Courts and the Rise of CreativityBased Originality Rhetoric.
During the 1880s and 1890s, news organizations like the Associated Press and Western
Union (which, although mainly a telegraph company, made occasional forays into the news
dissemination business) attempted to gain legal protection for news in both the Congress and the
courts. The one serious attempt in Congress took place in 1884. This article will argue that the
most important attempt in the courts culminated in a federal court of appeals decision in 1902.
In both cases, this paper will argue, those attempts led to the articulation of a creativity-based
view of the originality requirement in copyright.
A. The News Copyright Bill of 1884. In late 1883, the Associated Press sent Henry
Watterson to Washington, D.C. to seek passage of a bill that would grant short-term protection to
articles published in newspapers.97 Watterson was the founder and editor of the Louisville
Courier-Journal; he had served a partial term in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1876 and
1877, having been elected to serve out the remaining term of a Kentucky Congressman who had
died in office.
On March 4, 1884, Senator John Sherman of Ohio introduced “A Bill Granting Copyright
in Newspapers.”98 Six days later, Representative John Randolph Tucker of Virginia introduced
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an identical bill in the House.99 The bills sought to grant newspapers and newspaper associations
“the sole right to print, issue and sell for the term of eight hours, dating from the hour of going to
press, the contents of [the] newspaper, or the collected news of said newspaper association,
exceeding one hundred words.”100 Thus, the rights were granted directly to the newspaper or the
association, rather than to the author of the contents;101 and they were good for eight hours from
going to press.
Newspapers across the United States quickly learned of the bill, and devoted their own
column space to engaging in vigorous debate about it. The opponents of the news copyright bill
sent scores of petitions to Congress. Entries in the Congressional Record document the receipt
of at least 60 separate petitions in opposition, received from citizens of at least 19 of the 38 states
then in the Union, and of the Dakota Territory.102 Many of those petitions have been preserved
in the National Archives.103 Most of the petitions opposing the bills were sent on identical
printed forms with blank spaces to be filled in with the name, newspaper affiliation, and address
of the petitioner, which suggests that there was organized opposition to the bills. By contrast,
Congress apparently received only one petition in favor of the bill, though that was from the
Southern Press Association, which represented 22 newspaper members.104
The bill divided newspapers along four overlapping fault lines. First and most
prominently, it divided the “metropolitan” papers – big-city papers with large circulations that
could afford to hire their own reporting staffs and to pay to belong to a news association and
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That any daily or weekly newspaper or any association of daily or weekly newspapers,
published in the United States, or any of the Territories thereof, shall have the sole right to print, issue and
sell for the term of eight hours dating from the hour of going to press, the contents of said daily or weekly
newspaper, or the collected news of said newspaper association exceeding one hundred words.
Section 2. That for any infringement of the copyright granted by the first section of this Act, the party
injured may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction, and recover in any proper action the damages
sustained by him from the person making the infringement, together with the costs of suit.
Two other copyright bills that have sometimes been mistakenly identified as being related to these are H.R. 7341,
47th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced Jan. 23, 1883) (Cong. Rec. p. 286), and H.R. 62, 48th Cong., see 15 Cong. Rec. 60
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conditions (the conditions included “caus[ing] to be published six times, in the journal or periodical in which said
articles originally appeared . . . a notice that [the author] had acquired such copyright protection.”
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receive telegraph dispatches – from the “country press,” small-town papers that continued to rely
heavily on borrowed material to fill their pages. To the metropolitan papers like the New York
Times, “the country newspapers [were] beneath the rule of men with whom the scissors are
mightier than the pen”; it and the other metropolitans were victims of the typical “rural editor,”
who had to “loo[k] back over a career of small piracies.”105 The country press agreed that the
news copyright bill pitted them against the metropolitans, but cast the bill in a negative light. It
was, according to the Newark Daily Advocate (Newark, Ohio), “a monopoly scheme to force the
readers in the smaller towns to depend for their news upon the metropolitan press ring, to the
exclusion of the home journals.”106 As the editor of the Elizabeth Journal (of Elizabeth, New
Jersey) argued, “the result of passing such a bill would be to cripple the local press of New
Jersey and place the people of that state at the mercy of the New York and Philadelphia papers,
which have no interest in the welfare of the small New Jersey towns, and no space in which to
discuss the local interests of the numerous places in which they are constantly seeking to
encroach upon the preserves of the local press.”107
Second, the news copyright bills set the Associated Press and its members (many of
whom were the “metropolitan” papers) against the members of the United Press -- at that time a
two-year-old competitor of the AP108 -- and against independent papers that were not members of
either association. The United Press did not itself publicly oppose the bills,109 but some of its
prominent members did,110 and the opposition to the bill was often tied to animosity towards the
“monopolies” of the Associated Press and the Western Union.111
Third, the bill set afternoon papers, which were often accused of lifting material from
morning-paper competitors, against the morning papers that were the alleged victims of the
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borrowing.112 Similarly and fourthly, it set East Coast papers, which were the first to go to press
every day, against western papers located in time zones that lagged one to three hours behind the
East Coast, putting them in a position to borrow material from published East Coast papers.
For purposes of this article, the important thing about this debate is to note how
opponents of the bill contested it, and how supporters defended it. One of the most prominent
arguments used against the bill articulated and depended upon a creativity-based view of
originality. For example, the printed petition against the bill, copies of which were sent by
dozens of newspaper editors to Congress, asked “What is news? The statement of facts, the
history of current events. Can any one create or invent a fact or event? If he cannot create or
invent a fact or event, how can he copyright it?”113 Similarly, the Newark Daily Advocate of
Newark, Ohio reported a speech by Representative John Anderson of Kansas, railing against the
bills: “While there may be a possible ground for copyrighting the editorial, as the product of the
editor’s brain, what ground is there for copyrighting, say, election returns, or the news of
Garfield’s murder! Does the editor create them in the sense that an author creates a book? In my
mind the measure is a glaring wrong, glittering with impertinence . . . .”114
Almost two decades after Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co, Inc.,115
the contention that facts are not copyrightable because they aren’t created by authors appears
perfectly familiar to us. Yet in 1884, existing case law and treatises did not contain such
reasoning. Courts and treatise writers uniformly supported the view that a work which presented
facts that had been gathered by observation of the world should be protected under copyright
law. However, they had not been faced with the issue of protecting facts about current events –
news. To opponents of the news copyright bill, news seemed different, and they hoped that they
could convince Congress it was.
News seemed different in several respects. First, current events did not seem to be a
suitable subject for methodical, sustained study. Map and chart makers went on surveying
expeditions using special tools to measure distances that would eventually be represented in their
maps or charts. Authors of directories systematically canvassed neighborhoods or institutions.
By contrast, events that formed the basis of the news could often not be predicted in advance,
and thus it seemed fortuitous that a particular person would learn of a newsworthy event. As an
article in February 21, 1884 issue of The Nation, commenting on the newspaper copyright bill,
put it:
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[I]t is absurd to talk of a man who picks up a piece of news or an “item” as an “author” at
all. The reason why copyright laws are passed is to secure the fruits of original,
intellectual labor. But the proposed copyright in “news” does not do this. Any one may
collect news without any original intellectual effort, and with very little effort of any
kind. Some people do it by listening at keyholes, most people in the ordinary course of
conversation with the persons whom they meet in the way of business or pleasure. If a
collector of news in London telegraphs to New York that . . . Lord Cairns has offered
Miss Fortescue £10,000 to release his son from his marriage engagement, who is the
person whose “property” in the news ought to be protected, or who is the “author” of
it?116
This view of how news was gathered – “in the ordinary course of conversation with the persons
whom they meet in the way of business or pleasure” – was outdated even in 1884. Newspapers
and news associations had already begun to employ reporters to go out and find news, not just to
report whatever they happened to hear in casual conversations. And, of course, much of the
investment was not in finding news, but in transmitting it quickly over great distances. Yet this
image that news was acquired largely by chance was quite powerful, and fit in well with the
argument that copyright required intellectual labor that was missing in newsgathering.
Second, fact-based works that were already protected under copyright law – maps,
directories, calendars, road-books, and the like – were rarely in narrative form. Rather, they
presented information in the form of lists, charts, maps, and the like. Not all news in newspapers
was presented in narrative form; stock prices and weather reports weren’t, for example. Both
sides in the news copyright debate, however, assumed that much of what the bill would protect
would be news stories – literary works in narrative form. This presented a new issue – how
should copyright law deal with factual material presented in narrative form? For narrative
literary works, copyright law already had developed a distinction between form and content.117
Thus, in Stowe v. Thomas,118 Justice Grier wrote: “A ‘copy’ of a book must, therefore, be a
transcript of the language in which the conceptions of the author are clothed; of something
printed and embodied in a tangible shape. The same conceptions clothed in another language
cannot constitute the same composition, nor can it be called a transcript or ‘copy’ of the same
‘book.’”119
Both opponents and proponents of the newspaper copyright bill seemed to proceed from
the assumption that copyright in newspapers would only protect the literal language of a news
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story, and that any newspaper editor would be able to rewrite the story so that it recounted the
same facts but avoided infringement liability. For the Atlanta Constitution, which opposed the
newspaper copyright bill, this meant that the bill would be ineffectual: “Neither facts nor
incidents can be copyrighted, but only the form in which they are presented. This is no remedy
at all, for the papers that steal their news would not be balked by the copyright of form merely,
and this is all that any copyright can cover.”120 For the Galveston Daily News, which supported
the bill, this meant that the bill would not give anyone a monopoly over news, but would stop
newspapers from literal copying: “Copyright would protect a telegram or other matter in the
form in which it appears. It would not prevent any writer from making in his own words a
statement of the facts alleged in the telegram. The so-called newspapers that feed on other
newspapers would either have to dismiss the scissors brigade and do some writing instead of
clipping, or they would have to make arrangements with the Associated Press for its matter, if
they wanted it within twenty-four hours.”121
Interestingly, the Dunkirk (N.Y.) Evening Observer, a staunch opponent of the bill, made
a rare direct mention of the existing copyright protection for directories, but it then distinguished
news stories, without elaborating: “It is supposed by some that because . . . a city directory may
be copyrighted, therefore news dispatches may be also; and so they may, so far as the original
wording or form of dispatch is concerned, but the information contained in the dispatches cannot
be, and any attempt to prevent the free use of such information will lead to litigation and result in
failure.”122
Third, news was important to the political and cultural life of the country, and to political
and cultural speech, in a way that directories and maps weren’t. As the Milwaukee Sentinel put
it, “[news] becomes a matter of common information as soon as it is printed, and men may
spread it by word of mouth or may write to one another about it . . . . To prevent other journals
from commenting upon it is to stifle free discussion, and to permit them to comment is to permit
them to republish the matter.”123 The concern about freedom of the press was particularly
pointed in light of the size and power of the Associated Press – many were sure that the practical
result of the news copyright bill would be, not the decentralized sale and purchase of news
stories by many newspapers, but further concentration of the news business. As The Evening
Observer (Dunkirk, NY) put it, “The Sherman copyright bill [is] designed to create a monopoly
of newsgathering. It was instigated and was backed by the associated press and the metropolitan
newspapers. The associated press is the worst kind of a monopoly, and yet additional protection
120
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is asked for! . . . We cannot understand how a monopoly of newsgathering can in any way
advantage the people.”124 The Associated Press was supposed to be neutral, but Menaham
Blondheim has argued that its selection of news items was actually biased in favor of the
Republican Party and against the Democrats,125 and it was also not above agreeing to refrain
from any criticism of the Western Union Telegraph Company, in return for favorable access to
telegraph lines and a promise that Western Union would not itself enter the news business.126
Fourth, with works such as directories and maps, application of a “market substitute”
doctrine of infringement could accommodate the most pressing concerns about free speech while
protecting the core economic interests of copyright owners. Directories and maps documented
large numbers of names, addresses, geographical relationships, and the like, and were bought as
reference works. Purchasers would consult them many times over an extended period, and
would likely consult different parts of the works at different times. That market for reference
works was only endangered if a copier reproduced all or a substantial portion of a work. Thus, in
the market for reference works a “market substitute” doctrine would leave room for the kind of
copying that authors who did not set out to duplicate the work in question were likely to want to
do. An author would be free to use and incorporate a single directory entry or some information
incorporated on a map without fear of infringement.
Newspapers were different, however. Each daily edition was modest in size, and its
market value was short-lived. People often bought the daily paper to read the lead story about
some sensational event, and then discarded it. Subsequent authors might well want to repeat the
essential facts of that lead story. Under these circumstances, the “market substitute” doctrine had
much less maneuvering room to mediate between the economic interests of the copyright owner
and the interests of the reader in speaking freely about what he or she had learned. The situation
was even worse with news tickers, which dispensed content in a continuous stream, making it
difficult to identify a “work” of any size greater than a single news item.
In light of these conditions, the logic that lay behind the intellectual-labor view of
originality, and the consequent protection of fact-based works, probably seemed quaint to the
opponents of the news copyright bill, and the “market substitute” infringement doctrine did not
seem to offer any clear relief. Were the events that formed the basis of news reports “common
sources of information open to all”? Once one heard of the report of an event, it was too late to
go witness it oneself – time had moved forward – and those who did witness it were already
dispersing. Moreover, the means of transmitting the report from the distant site of the event to
one’s own location were not open on equal terms to all: the Western Union owned the telegraph
lines, and it offered the Associated Press special terms. Thus, maps, directories, and news
reports might be equated at some abstract level, but they did not seem similar when placed in
their concrete social context.
In the end, the news copyright bill died. The New York Times had predicted that the
political influence of the country press, widespread throughout the Union, could decide the issue:
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“If country members of Congress are instructed by their constituents that the news copyright bill
is a defense for metropolitan journals, (as is very likely the case,) the country members will
defeat the bill beyond peradventure.”127 The “country members” never got to vote on the bill; it
was reported out of the Committee of the Library with a recommendation that it not pass, and
was allowed to disappear quietly.128
B. Seeking Protection for News in the Courts. By the late spring of 1884, the
Associated Press realized that its quest to obtain legislative protection for news was going to be
futile. From the vantage point of 1919, Henry Watterson looked back on his trip to Washington
to lobby for the bill as a “fool’s errand.”129 But the legislature wasn’t the only forum in which
the Associate Press could pursue protection for news. Watterson recounted that while he was in
Washington, “a learned but dissolute lawyer said to me, “You need no act of Congress to protect
your news service. There are at least two, and I think four or five, English rulings that cover the
case. Let me show them to you.’”130 Watterson then commented, “To a recent date the
Associated Press has relied on these decisions under the common law of England.”131
Watterson no doubt received this advice before he testified in front of the House Committee
on the Judiciary on March 24, 1884, because his testimony on that occasion featured the
argument that English courts had already decided in favor of copyright for news.132 Watterson
relied principally on Vice Chancellor Sir Richard Malins’s133 opinion in the 1869 English Court
of Chancery case of Cox v. Land and Water Journal Company.134 Cox was in more than one
respect a great case for Watterson and the interests that he represented. Mr. Cox, the plaintiff,
was the proprietor of a newspaper called the Field. The Field had published a directory of hunts
in the United Kingdom which included “the name of each hunt, with the nearest town convenient
for strangers, the number of the hounds in the pack, the hunting days, the names of the masters,
huntsmen, and whips, and the address of the kennel.”135 The defendant had copied that list from
the Field and published it in another periodical, the Land and Water Journal. The court held for
the plaintiff, finding that he had a right to the material that he had invested in collecting. Of
course, a directory of hunts is not a news story. However, the Cox court posed a hypothetical
that did involve news, and that involved a scenario that was particularly relevant to telegraph
news services like Watterson’s Associated Press:
Now, suppose, for instance, the proprietor of a newspaper employs a correspondent
abroad, and that correspondent, being employed and sent abroad at great expense, makes
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communications to a newspaper which are highly appreciated by the public, can it be said
that another newspaper, published, perhaps, in the evening of the same day, may take and
publish those communications in extenso, with or without acknowledgment?136
It was clear that the question was rhetorical, and the answer was supposed to be “no”; that
was exactly the answer the news agencies wanted.
The major contemporary treatises also presented the law on copyright in news in terms that
were favorable to news agencies. In the 1881 Second Edition of his already well-established
English treatise, Walter Copinger stated that “there can of course by copyright in telegrams,”137
and cited in support of this statement a recent Australian case, Wilson v. Luke.138 According to
Copinger, “[i]t was argued for the defendant [in Wilson] that, as the telegrams were matters of
news, any one could re-publish them without breach of the Copyright Act; but Mr. Justice
Molesworth held that the plaintiff had a property in the telegrams, and that no one could republish them without the permission of the person to whom they had been sent in the first
instance.”139
An 1891 treatise, Fisher and Strahan’s The Law of the Press,140 framed the issue with
exquisite clarity, and also decided it in favor of news agencies. “No doubt there is copyright in
the literary form given to news,”141 wrote Fisher and Strahan. “The difficulty is whether there is
copyright in the substance of the news.”142 They considered that issue at some length, and
concluded that “on the principle that applies to the cases of Directories and Lists of judgments,
we are inclined to believe that there is.” 143
It is difficult to see what distinction can be made between the skill and labour necessary
to collect the news of a district and the skill and labour necessary to collect the names and
residences of the inhabitants of a district, or to compile a list of the judgments recovered in a
district. In all three cases the material on which the result is based is common to the world,
and two persons working accurately on that material would produce practically the same
result, and the result would be a statement of facts.144
In support of their conclusion, Fisher and Strahan cited both Cox and Wilson, the cases
mentioned earlier by Watterson and Copinger.
In spite of those cases and commentary, however, the news agencies still faced a problem
under U.S. copyright law. The Field, the newspaper at issue in Cox v. Land and Water Journal
Company, had not been registered, but relying on a somewhat doubtful interpretation of English
law, Vice Chancellor Malins granted relief to the plaintiff anyway.145 In 1881, that interpretation
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was pointedly questioned in Walter v. Howe,146 which held that newspapers did need to be
registered to be protected under English copyright law. The holding in Walter was later followed
by two 1889 cases, which confirmed that there would be no protection of newspapers without
registration.147 In England, however, there was a special registration provision for periodicals,
which allowed the owner of copyright in the periodical to register just once for the entire series;
that registration was good so long as the periodical maintained regular publication.148
The U.S. Copyright Act did not contain any special registration provision for works
published in series. It continued to require registration for each separately published work
covered under the Act. Daily newspapers continued not to register their individual issues as they
were published; and if under certain circumstances telegraph dispatches themselves were going
to count as publications, they would face even greater difficulties meeting the registration
requirement. Thus, news agencies needed a legal strategy for avoiding the registration
requirement under U.S. copyright law.
This issue came to a head in 1901, when Western Union sued a company called the
National Telegraph News Company. Western Union had itself entered the news business, in a
limited fashion. It had purchased the Gold & Stock Telegraph Company, which owned the rights
to an early telegraph ticker machine, and had continued the Gold & Stock business of providing
the owner of a newspaper acquired for publication an article or other material from an author, “he acquires - I will
not say as copyright, but as property - such a property in every article for which he pays, under the 18th section of
the Act, or by the general rules of property, as will entitle him, if he thinks it worth while, to prohibit any other
person from publishing the same thing in any other newspaper, or in any other form.” Cox v. Land and Water
Journal Co., [L R] 9 Eq 324 (1869) (emphasis added). As the italicized portion of the quote indicates, Malins
somewhat dubiously avoided deciding whether he was awarding relief to the newspaper based on statutory
copyright, common law copyright, or some other common law doctrine, and did not face the issue whether the first
of those might preempt the latter two.
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news service directly to ticker machines. Those tickers were installed in hotels, saloons, and
private companies that wanted “instant information of passing events of more or less importance
throughout the world,” and sometimes, in particular, news of sporting events, no doubt of special
The National Telegraph News Company had a
interest to gamblers and bookmakers.149
competing business of providing a news service through tickers. It admitted that it had been
copying news items from the Western Union tickers, and sending them out on its own wires, “so
that within a very few minutes from the time th[e] news appears upon the tapes of the [Western
Union] tickers it re-appears upon the tapes of the [National Telegraph News Company]
tickers.”150 Western Union argued that the National Telegraph News Company charged less for
its subscriptions because it had no expenses for gathering news, and that Western Union had
been forced to lower its prices to retain subscribers.151
Western Union obtained a preliminary injunction from the District Court that prohibited
National Telegraph News from using any news items it had gathered from Western Union tickers
for 60 minutes after they appeared on those tickers. National Telegraph News appealed.
National’s chief argument on appeal was that Western Union had published the ticker tapes
without registration, notice, or deposit, and had therefore abandoned common-law copyright in
them without acquiring copyright under federal law.152 Western Union decided to argue that the
reports that it transmitted to the tickers were not copyrightable subject matter under federal law,
and hence that federal requirements of registration, notice and deposit upon publication did not
apply:
[W]e respectfully protest at the outset, and in the holy name of arts and letters, that the
reports of passing events sent over [Western Union] tickers to saloons, hotels and
brokers’ offices, is not, properly speaking, literature; that it does not come within the
purview of the copyright statutes; that would not be entitled to the protection of such
statutes even if every condition precedent prescribed by them had been punctiliously
complied with; and that it would not, therefore, be subject to diminution because of any
failure to comply therewith.153
Why were the reports not copyrightable subject matter? Western Union cited the old 1829 case
of Clayton v. Stone,154 and argued as Justice Thompson had in Clayton that the ticker reports
provided only “a history of inconsequential contemporaneous events which adds nothing to the
learning of the world.”155 However, perhaps aware that Clayton had not remained a strong
precedent, it also argued that news was not copyrightable because it was not the product of any
author: “Could you call the writer of [a telegraph message giving the result of a baseball match
or a horse-race, or the fluctuations of the stock market] an ‘author?’ The very absurdity of the
proposition is its own refutation.”156 Thus, a prominent force in the news industry, Western
Union, had itself decided to adopt a creativity-based view of originality to avoid a charge of
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abandonment and forfeiture of copyright protection, and to try its luck arguing that common law
still protected its reports.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, and Judge Peter Grosscup wrote
an opinion that provides a pioneering, astoundingly clear use of the rhetoric of creativity-based
originality, and of the associated notion of the romantic author. “Authorship,” he wrote, “implies
that there has been put into the production something meritorious from the author’s own mind;
that the product embodies the thought of the author, as well as the thought of others; and would
not have found existence in the form presented, but for the distinctive individuality of mind from
which it sprang.”157 News reports, he concluded, did not usually bear the stamp of a particular
mind, and therefore were not the products of an author that copyright law should protect.
A mere annal . . . is the reduction to copy of an event that others, in a like situation,
would have observed; and its statement in the substantial form that people generally
would have adopted. . . . [I]f . . . writings are a mere notation of the figures at which
stocks or cereals have been sold, or of the result of a horse race, or base-ball game, they
cannot be said to bear the impress of individuality, and fail, therefore, to rise to the plane
of authorship. In authorship, the product has some likeness to the mind underneath it; in
a work of mere notation, the mind is guide only to the fingers that make the notation.
One is the product of originality; the other the product of opportunity.158
Nevertheless, Grosscup and his brethren held, the news service provided by Western Union has a
commercial and social value that deserves legal protection – it is a “modern enterprise – one of
the distinctive achievements of our day – which, combining the genius and accumulations of
men, with the forces of electricity, combs the earth’s surface, each day, for what the day has
brought forth, that whatever befalls the sons of men shall come, almost instantaneously, into the
consciousness of mankind.”159 Thus, the court upheld the injunction on common-law grounds.
The release of National Telegraph News decision marks a significant moment in American
copyright history. For the first time, a federal court concluded that a large category of products
of intellectual labor – news accounts that were “mere annals” – was not copyrightable subject
matter, on the basis of a creativity-based interpretation of the originality requirement.
C. Parallels and Effects: The Context and Aftermath of the Newspaper Copyright
Bill Debate and the National Telegraph News Decision. The debate over the Newspaper
Copyright Bill and the National Telegraph News litigation were not the only fora in which
copyright law was faced with the increasing desire of newspapers for protection of their
investments in newsgathering. English jurists had to deal with the same trend, and Walter
Copinger’s treatise on copyright law, of which new editions were regularly being published
during the era – 1870, 1881, 1893, 1904, and 1915 – provides an interesting glimpse of
developments. The First and Second Editions of Copinger’s treatise, published in 1870 and
1881, do not reject copyright in news; if anything, the Second Edition, as noted above, tends
toward supporting it.160 In 1893, however, the Third Edition makes a break. Copinger states:
“There can be little doubt but that there is copyright in the literary form given to news – not in
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the substance of the news itself, but in the form in which it is conveyed. . . . One newspaper
cannot legally use the telegrams sent to another, but we are not able to go so far as to admit
copyright in the substance of the news as distinguished from the form of language by which that
substance is conveyed.”161 Interestingly enough, however, he cites no authority for this position –
the statement appears to be no more than Copinger’s own opinion.
The 1904 Fourth Edition of Copinger’s treatise, written by J.M. Easton, retained the
Third Edition passage quoted above, but Easton added a citation to the 1892 decision of the
Court of Chancery in Walter v. Steinkopff.162 In Walter, the St. James Gazette had copied several
items from the Times, most prominently excerpts of a piece by Rudyard Kipling on America.
When the Times sued, the Gazette set up as one defense an established custom of borrowing
between newspapers, which it described in some detail. No doubt this custom had in fact existed
in England, just as it had in the United States. Yet Sir Frederick North, who decided the case,
held that such a custom had no legal effect. Then came the passage that supported the statement
in Copinger’s treatise: “It is said that there is no copyright in news. But there is or may be
copyright in the particular forms of language or modes of expression by which information is
conveyed . . . .”163 And, decided North, the Gazette had copied those forms of language from the
Times. Notably, North presents the statement that there is no copyright in news in the passive
case, without citations, and hence without any attribution. It sounds as though North may be
stating a universally recognized truth, and yet, along with Copinger’s contemporaneous Third
Edition statement, similarly floated without authority, it is among the first articulations of the
principle that there can be no copyright in news, and the nascent fact/expression doctrine.
Back in the United States, both the debate on the Newspaper Copyright Bill and the
National Telegraph News decision influenced commentators and courts. In his 1912 book
Copyright: Its History and Its Law, Richard Rogers Bowker contended that the failure to pass the
Newspaper Copyright Bill meant that there was no copyright protection for news, but only for
the literary form in which it was recounted:
A bill to protect news for twenty-four hours was at one time before Congress, but
was never passed. There is, therefore, no copyright protection for news as such, but the
general copyright of the newspaper or a special copyright may protect the form of a
dispatch, letter or article containing news.164
Bowker then noted that the National Telegraph News case provided common-law protection for
news on ticker tapes.165 The following year, the Southern District of New York cited the Bowker
account with approval in support of a broad statement that facts were not copyrightable: “[T]here
can be no piracy of facts, because facts are public property,”166 stated Judge Hough; he then
opined that “a fair summary of the law on [the impossibility of copyrighting news] is, I think,
contained in Bowker on Copyright, pp. 88, 89.”167 The case proceeded to hold that fiction
presented as news should also be uncopyrightable, essentially adopting a theory of estoppel.
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In his 1917 copyright law treatise,168 Arthur William Weil quoted extensive passages
from National Telegraph News, which he praised as “an extremely able opinion.”169 In
particular, Weil quoted approvingly the passage from National Telegraph News denying
copyright to “mere annals” while criticizing Justice Holmes’s apparent acceptance of the
copyrightability of directories in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.170 In the same year,
William B. Hale, whose copyright treatise was published as volume 13 of Corpus Juris,171 cited
National Telegraph News in support of two related propositions: that there is no copyright in
news,172 but that there is common-law protection of news, which is not destroyed by publication
because news is not literary property.173
1917 is also the year that Judge Augustus Hand issued the District Court decision in
Associated Press v. International News Service.174 This litigation, of course, culminated in the
Supreme Court’s decision in International News Service v. Associated Press175 the following
year. The Supreme Court’s recognition of a property right in news in this litigation has been
widely recognized and extensively analyzed. The role of the INS case in establishing that news
is not copyrightable, however, has received somewhat less emphasis. Judge Hand’s opinion
decision directly addressed the policy question – should news be given some post-publication
protection? – with little discussion of the legal issue of how to avoid dedication to the public
under the federal copyright scheme, which by that time had dropped the registration requirement,
but still required proper notice upon publication.176
As for the issue of post-publication protection for news, Hand announced that he was
“personally satisfied . . . that the right exists to prevent the sale by a competing news agency of
news which is taken from early publications of complainant’s members before sufficient time
has elapsed to afford opportunity for general publication.”177 In support of such a proposition,
Hand rested heavily on National Telegraph News, and his opinion contained a three-paragraph,
700-word quote from Judge Grosscup’s opinion in that case.178 Yet Judge Hand concluded that
the legal issue was not sufficiently free from doubt to grant a preliminary injunction prohibiting
copying altogether. Rather, he issued a preliminary injunction that only forbade INS from
inducing agents of the Associated Press, or of its member newspapers, to furnish it with news in
breach of AP policy. That meant that INS was still free to obtain published copies of East Coast
newspapers and transmit that news to West Coast clients.
Both sides appealed the preliminary injunction. As appellate counsel, the Associated
Press engaged none other than Peter Stenger Grosscup himself, author of the National Telegraph
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News opinion, who had resigned from his Seventh Circuit judgeship in 1911.179 In a split
decision, the Second Circuit, citing National Telegraph News with approval,180 extended the
preliminary injunction to cover copying of Associated Press news even when it was procured
from publicly available newspapers. Judge Charles Merrill Hough’s opinion directly addressed
the issue of whether news content was copyrightable, and embraced a creativity-based view of
originality: “It may be granted that . . . publication at common law terminated an author’s rights
in his manuscript and the fruits of his brain; yet it still remains true that plaintiff’s property in
news is not literary at all, that it is not capable of copyright, and that ‘publication,’ as that word is
used in the long line of decisions regarding literary rights, has no determinative bearing on this
case.”181
When the case reached the Supreme Court, it split the Justices six to three, but not on the
issue whether copyright law incorporated a creativity-based originality requirement. For the
majority, Justice Pitney concluded that “the news element – the information respecting current
events contained in the literary production – is not the creation of the writer,”182 and therefore
was not copyrightable. Justice Pitney echoed concerns expressed in both the Newspaper
Copyright Bill debates and the National Telegraph News decision about granting exclusive rights
over “the history of the day.”183 The framers of the Constitution, he argued, could not have
“intended to confer upon one who might happen to be the first to report a historic event the
exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it.”184 In dissent, Justice Brandeis
expressed similar support for a creativity-based originality standard that would exclude factual
matter. “[I]ntellectual productions, he contended, “are entitled to such protection only if there is
underneath something evincing the mind of a creator or originator, however modest the
requirement. The mere record of isolated happenings . . . are denied such protection.”185 In
support, he cited, among other cases, National Telegraph News.186 Justice Holmes’s separate
dissent did not touch directly on the issue, but he could be safely counted on the side of
creativity-based originality as well, since his statement in the 1903 case of Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co.187 is a crystalline expression of that view: “The copy is the
personal reaction of an individual upon nature. . . a very modest grade of art has in it something
irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright . . . .”188
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As an experiment in common-law protection of intellectual property, International News
Service v. Associated Press can probably be counted as a failure. It has not spawned a broad
jurisprudence of common-law intellectual property, but has been given a narrow reading, limited
to “hot news” misappropriation;189 and its views on federal court jurisdiction have been
thoroughly repudiated.190 As the statement of a view of originality that excludes independently
created factual accounts from copyright protection, however, it can be counted as a success.
Although some post-INS courts continued to protect compilations of facts without a showing of
creative selection or arrangement, the Supreme Court eventually vindicated INS in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co, Inc.191 Thus, the debate over copyright in
news, beginning with the Newspaper Copyright Bill in 1884 and continuing through the National
Telegraph News case, resulted in the rise of a creativity-based model of originality that received
unanimous Supreme Court approval in 1918 and has only been strengthened and broadened by
Feist.
V. Lessons from the Newspaper Copyright Debate
What can we learn from the debate over copyright in news, and the transformation of
originality doctrine in that debate?
First, it is a reminder that although copyright doctrines and rationales may be framed at
high levels of abstraction, they are likely to enjoy success only under a much more particular set
of conditions, and those conditions are likely to change over time. Nineteenth-century judges
and commentators articulated a view of copyright originality under which factual matter was
entitled to copyright protection; those who wanted to sell works that imparted information were
exhorted to go out and gather it themselves, rather than free-ride on the intellectual labor of those
who had already gathered it. Yet while that view is stated in general enough terms to make it
applicable to news and news-gathering, the view became settled orthodoxy without ever being
tested within the news industry, because at that time the news industry had no interest in
protection for news. Once it gained such an interest, the intellectual labor theory was severely
strained, because news, as it functioned within late-nineteenth-century American culture, did not
fit the presuppositions of that theory very well. Witnessing a current event seemed to many to be
as much a matter of chance as of labor and investment. News often came in narrative form,
which allowed for a greater distinction between form and content than was possible with
directories and maps. News seemed to be of more immediate political and cultural importance,
and its free dissemination seemed particularly important when non-local news gathering was
dominated by a very small number of large organizations. Moreover, “market substitute”
infringement doctrine had much less maneuvering space to mediate between the economic
interests of copyright owners and the interest in free dissemination when individual news items
could become the selling points for newspaper issues, and could become independent works in
the continuous stream of the news ticker.
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Second, the news copyright debate demonstrates the interdependence of the myriad
doctrines that constitute copyright law. It is not particularly surprising that the “country press,”
which was opposed to any form of protection for news, advanced a creativity-based view of the
originality requirement under which news matter was not copyrightable. Yet under copyright
law as it existed at the turn of the twentieth century, the Western Union, which strongly desired
protection for its news items, decided that it also wanted to advance a creativity-based view of
originality, because its news ticker service could not satisfy the formalities of registration and
notice; better to argue that news was outside of the reach of copyright altogether, and could
therefore still qualify for common-law protection.
The removal of news content from copyright – a contraction of copyright protection
along the dimension of copyrightable subject matter – may also have made it easier for copyright
to expand along other dimensions. If copyright was going to focus less on news, and more on
fiction and entertainment, then the opposition to increases in scope of protection, such as
protection of derivative works, and in length of copyright term, would decrease. This continues
to be relevant to the current debate about whether patent and copyright law should have special
rules for each industry that avails itself of patent or copyright protection.192 It remains to be seen
whether tailoring is a useful tool to ensure that each industry receives protection at a level that is
optimal for society as a whole, or is an opportunity for each industry to ensure that as much
market surplus as possible is captured by producers rather than consumers.
One important issue that cannot be completely resolved within the scope of this article is
the fate of the distinction between news reports, on the one hand, and other fact-based works like
directories and maps, on the other. If, indeed, news reports posed different issues than
directories and maps, thus requiring a rethinking of prevailing originality doctrine, why doesn’t
copyright law continue to distinguish between them? Why did the Feist Court end up treating
them all the same, with a broad, sweeping statement about the non-copyrightability of facts?
There is certainly more work to be done on this issue, but perhaps the reader will indulge a few
preliminary observations. First, the distinction persisted for decades, albeit somewhat
inconsistently given the number of federal courts involved and the confusion in the law.
Important lower courts, such as the Second Circuit, gave notice that in spite of INS v. AP they
were sticking to the view that the copyright in directories was not limited to creative selection
and arrangement.193 Second, the argument against copyright in news that had the most
immediate and simplest intuitive appeal – that reporters did not create the facts that they
documented – had implications beyond news, and those implications were difficult to ignore.
Third, the Copyright Act did not provide a strong textual hook for maintaining such a distinction.
Interestingly, the Berne Convention, the drafting of which began in 1884 – the same year as the
Newspaper Copyright Bill – contemplated that its signatories would treat news differently. It
provided for a default rule of free copying of news stories, another sign that the custom of news
copying was not confined to the United States.194 Yet if the United States never adopted special
192

See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 Am.
Univ. L. Rev. 845 (2006); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17 Berkeley Tech.
L. J. 1155, 1159 (2002); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet
Revolution, 11 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (2004).
193
See, e.g., Jeweler’s Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
194
Article 7 of the original Berne Convention of September 9, 1886 provided that newspaper and magazine articles
published in any country that was a member of the Berne Union could be reproduced, in the original language or in
translation, unless the authors or editors expressly prohibited it; furthermore, the prohibition would not apply to
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statutory protection for news stories, it never adopted a special exclusion for them either, and
that made it difficult to maintain a distinction.
Thus, all that remains is to reiterate the main thesis of this article. An intellectual-laborbased view of originality, and of the scope of copyright protection, developed during an era
when the news industry was uninterested in copyright. When major news industry players
became interested in protection for news, due to technological and social changes that reshaped
that industry, debate about the appropriateness and shape of that protection in Congress and the
courts gave a substantial boost to a creativity-based view of originality that grew in dominance
during the 20th century and today is established orthodoxy.

articles that discussed political matters or news of the day. It was not until the Stockholm Conference in 1967 that
this default blanket license provision was deleted; the current text contains one vestige of the original provision, the
statement in Article 2(8) that “The Protection of the Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to
miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information.” See Sam Ricketson, The Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-1986 302-06 (1987).
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